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LIST OF PARTIES 
The parties to this proceeding are: plaintiff: William G. Ercanbrack; and 
defendants: Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc.; Homes by Oakwood, Inc.; SS Supply Inc.; 
Summit Propane (collectively referred to as "SS Supply"); Union Pacific Resources Co.; 
Eaton Metal Products, Inc.; Flare Construction, Inc.; and Natural Gas Odorizing. 
The only parties to this appeal are plaintiff, William G. Ercanbrack and 
defendants Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc. and Homes by Oakwood, Inc. (collectively 
referred to as Oakwood). The other defendants settled with plaintiff prior to trial and are 
not parties to the appeal. 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0). 
ISSUES 
I. Did the trial court err in allowing plaintiffs expert to testify at trial 
when his scientific testimony was not reliable or supported by facts in the record? 
(Preserved at 3771-72; 3787-3861; 5499-5512; 6695; 6698; 7007:234, 236; 7008:168) 
Standard of Review: A trial court's determination as to an expert's 
qualifications and opinions is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Patey v. Lainhart. 
1999 UT 31,115, 977 P.2d 1193. 
II. Should all expert testimony be subject to some minimum threshold 
standard in order to be admissible at trial? (Preserved at 3771-72; 3787-3861; 5499-
5512; 6695; 6698; 7007:234, 236; 7008:168) 
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court correctly selected the 
applicable law and interpreted a prior judicial opinion is a question of law, reviewed for 
correctness. See Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc.. 2003 UT 511J56, _ P.3d _ ; 4447 
Assocs. v. First Sec. Fin.. 973 P.2d 992, 995 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
III. Did the trial court err in denying Oakwood's Motion for a Directed 
Verdict and J.N.O.V. on the issue of causation? (Preserved at 6807-59; 6925-43; 6964-
65; 7008:168; 7011:5-17) 
1 
Standard of Review: On appeal from a denial of a directed verdict, 
this court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party moved against, and 
will sustain the denial if reasonable minds could disagree with the ground asserted for 
directing a verdict. See Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, ^ [16, 990 P.2d 933; Walker v. 
Parish Chemical Co., 914 P.2d 1157, 1159 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (J.N.O.V.). 
IV. Did the trial court err in allowing evidence contrary to plaintiffs 
admissions to be introduced at trial after Oakwood had relied on the admissions in its 
opening statement to the jury? (Preserved at 5887-88; 6694:24-30; 7000:60-61) 
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision under Rule 36(b) is 
reviewed under a "conditional" discretionary standard. See Langeland v. Monarch 
Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058, 1060-61 (Utah 1998). 
V. Did the trial court err in not granting Oakwood a new trial as a result 
of plaintiff s improper and inflamatory remarks during closing arguments? (Preserved at 
7012:19-22, 70, and also reviewed for plain error. See State v. Medina Juarez, 2001 UT 
79,^18, 34P.3dl87). 
Standard of Review: Improper remarks during opening and closing 
statements constitutes an irregularity in proceedings, entitling a party to a new trial, which 
is viewed with discretion to the trial court. See Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 429 (Utah 
1999). "A district court has broad discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a 
motion for a new trial." Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, ffi[13, 35, 29 P.3d 638. 
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VI. Did the trial court err in not instructing the jury that SS Supply was a 
proximate cause of the injuries and in not informing the jury of the amount of SS 
SuppIy^s settlement with plaintiff? (Preserved at 5159; 5164-69; 6994:24-30, 49-52) 
Standard of Review: A trial court's jury instructions are reviewed for 
correctness. See Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, ^ [14, 29 P.3d 638. 
VII. Were the six errors discussed above coupled with additional errors 
sufficient to constitute cumulative error and deny Oakwood Due Process? 
Standard of Review: "Under the cumulative error doctrine, we will 
reverse only if 'the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our confidence . . . 
that a fair trial was had.'" State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND 
REGULATIONS 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 703 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration 
Rule 3.4 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 
United States Constitution XIV Amend. § 1 
Utah Const. Art. 1,§7 
Utah Code Ann. §78-15-6(3) 
(Each of these provisions is set forth verbatim in the addendum.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This wrongful death case arises out of an explosion at the Ercanbrack's 
manufactured home. As is typical in a massive explosion, the remaining evidence was 
scattered across the Ercanbrack's property. The fundamental problem facing all involved 
was determining what could have caused the massive explosion. Despite the lack of any 
physical evidence pointing to a specific cause, the trial court allowed plaintiff to present 
to the jury plaintiffs experts' conjured up a version of events, without regard to the facts 
in evidence. Plaintiffs theory was linked to a manufacturing standard for gas pipes. The 
only expert witness on the issue of standards for the mobile home industry, however, 
testified that standard was not enforced. Nevertheless, plaintiff argued to the jury it was 
the federal agency's lack of enforcement which caused shoddy manufacturing practices in 
the industry. This poor quality, plaintiff argued, is what ultimately caused the explosion. 
Notwithstanding the fact that punitive damages were not requested, plaintiff asked the 
jury to "send a message" to the federal agency via a large verdict against Oakwood that 
these practices would not be tolerated. The jury returned a verdict of $8,953,600.00. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prior to delivery, the Ercanbrack's home was manufactured in Fort Morgan, 
Colorado. (R. at 6698:82-83) The construction of manufactured homes is governed by 
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HUD, who has issued a set of regulations followed by Oakwood. (R. at 7004:80-82, 94, 
97). Each home has a document referred to as a "traveler" which is a check list and a 
quality control document for ea<' home. (R. at 7004:62, 66-67, 77) Each home is 
inspected and tested to ensure compliance with HUD standards. (R. at 7004:62, 66-67, 
77) 
In assembling the gas piping in its homes, Oakwood starts by cutting and 
threading the steel pipe which is then installed in the sub floor of the home. (R. at 
7004:69-71,162-63) The pipes are secured to the floor with thin metal straps which 
allow the pipe to be adjusted. (R. at 7004:156) In the Ercanbrack home, two risers came 
up from the gas piping beneath the floor to connect to the stove and furnace located in the 
living area. (R. at 7004:72) The holes through the floor are initially located and cut from 
floor prints. (R. at 7004:73) Importantly, if for some reason the hole does not line up 
properly with the pipe joint, then the pipe can be adjusted, the pipe can be unstrapped or 
the hole in the floor can be redrilled to allow the riser to be inserted through the hole 
properly. (R. at 7004:74,154,156,166-67; 7009:148-49) After the pipe and hole are 
lined up, the risers are inserted from the top through the hole and into the pipe below. (R. 
at 7004:164) 
Once the assembly of the gas line is complete, the entire gas piping system 
is inspected to make sure it meets the applicable HUD standards governing manufactured 
homes. (R. at 7004:80-82, 94) Under the HUD standards, the gas lines are pressure tested 
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to determine if the entire system is gas tight. (R. at 7004:91-92, 106) The HUD standard 
requires a high and low pressure test of the gas system to determine it will not leak. (R. at 
7004:123-24). The Ercanbrack home passed both the high and low pressure tests and did 
not leak when it left the Oakwood facility in Colorado. (R. at 7004:124) 
On or about July 9, 1997, Oakwood delivered the Ercanbrack's home to 
their property located in Clarks Canyon in Summit County. (R. at 7000:7, 12,154) The 
home was delivered in two halves which Oakwood puts together on top of footings which 
plaintiff had contracted with Flare to construct. (R. at 7000:13,123-24,131 158,161-62) 
After setting up the home, Oakwood's has no further involvement with the connection of 
the outside propane source. (R. at 7000:160-65) 
In addition to constructing the footings, Plaintiff contracted with Flare to 
construct a cinder block skirting around the base of his home. (R. at 741). Also, plaintiff 
contracted with SS Supply to deliver a propane tank and to connect the home to the 
propane tank. (R. at 741,741-42, 744, 7009:17-49) 
On August 7, 1997, SS Supply went to the Ercanbrack home to set up the 
propane tank and to hook it up to the home. (R. at 7009:17) When SS Supply examined 
the gas system, the SS Supply employee testified a stub-out pipe had already been 
installed onto the pipe built by Oakwood underneath the home. (R. at 7009:20) With 
respect to the installation of this stub-out, nobody is sure who installed it. (R. at 
7000:168,170) 
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SS Supply conducted a pressure test of the entire gas piping system in the 
home. (R, at 7009:20-24) As part of this pressure test, it was necessary for the SS Supply 
employee to physically pull the stove out to disconnect the gas line to the stove. (R. at 
7009:21) In conducting this test and pulling the stove out, SS Supply does a visual 
inspection of gas pipes for any irregularities. (R. at 7009:30) The employee of SS Supply 
testified the system appeared proper, the riser did not come out of the floor at an improper 
angle and he could not observe any irregularities in the system. (R. at 7009:31-32) The 
system was pumped to ten pounds of pressure, well in excess of approximate half pound 
of pressure the system would experience during normal use. (R. at 7009:21) The system 
was left at 10 pounds of pressure for approximately 20 to 30 minutes. (R. at 7009:22-23) 
The pressure test did not indicate any leak in the gas system. (R. at 7009:23-24) 
After the home was hooked to the propane tank, SS Supply conducted 
another pressure test and inspection of the entire gas system, including the appliances in 
the living space. (R. at 7009:27-28) Referred to as a line-block test, SS Supply 
determined the appliances functioned properly, the regulators properly lowered the 
pressure to the home and the entire gas piping system was gas tight. (R. at 7009:28) As 
part of this final test, another pressure test was done on the system. Again, the system 
held pressure, indicating it was gas tight. (R. at 7009:29) After SS Supply converted the 
appliances and hooked the system to the propane tank, it functioned properly and was gas 
tight. (R. at 7009:34-35) 
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Finally, SS Supply relocated the tank further away from the house. (R. at 
7000:172-75; 7009:39) Because the flexible line had to be replaced, SS Supply 
conducted another line-block test. (R. at 7009:39) This test indicated the gas system was 
still gas tight. (R. at 7009:39) 
After delivery of the home on July 9th, completion of the propane hookup 
on or about August 7th and completion of the cinder block skirting and landscaping, 
plaintiff and his family moved into the home on September 2, 1997. (R. at 7001:61) The 
Ercanbracks lived in the home without incident from September 2, 1997 until January 31, 
1998. On January 31,1998, a massive explosion occurred at the Ercanbrack's home, 
killing plaintiffs wife and two children (R. at 7000:17, 20) 
With respect to the standards governing manufactured homes, HUD 
establishes the requirements applicable to the manufactured home industry. (R. at 
7007:234-36, 249-54; 7009:162) The only expert offered regarding the applicability of 
standards to the manufactured home industry was Michael Slifka. (R. at 7007:249, 280; 
7009:139) In fact, plaintiffs expert relied on Slifka to establish the standards governing 
the manufactured home industry. (R. at 7007:249, 280) Although plaintiff introduced 
substantial evidence regarding threading and insertion standards under ANSI and ASME 
and HUD's reference of these standards, the only expert testimony on the standard 
governing gas piping in manufactured homes was that the homes needed to be gas tight. 
(R. at 7009:142-44) Specifically, the HUD standard provides if an installed gas system 
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passes pressure tests and does not leak, it has passed the only governing standard. (R. at 
7009:144) Based on the testimony of Oakwood's employees on manufacturing and 
testing of the Ercanbrack home and the SS Supply employee who pressure tested the 
system, the Ercanbrack home, as manufactured, met the applicable regulations. (R. at 
7010:61-64) 
Plaintiff relied on the expert testimony of three expert's at trial in an 
attempt to show Oakwood negligently manufactured the home. (R. at 7005:203, et seq. 
(Richard Thatcher); 7007:97, et. seq. (Joe Romig); 7007:278, et seq. (Dr. Frank Alex)). 
First, Thatcher and Rommig testified that the gas which caused the explosion could not 
have come from a source outside the Ercanbrack's home and crawl space. (R. at 
7006:138-56 (Thatcher); 7007:152-180 (Romig)) Additionally, Thatcher testified that the 
gas piping under the home did not have any small leaks capable of causing the explosion, 
that significant amounts of propane accumulated in the crawl space under the home and in 
the living area of the home and that the dryer was the likely ignition source for the 
explosion. (R. at 7006:38, 77-80,169-75,193-94; 7007:73) 
Relying on Thatcher and Romig's conclusion that the source of the propane 
leak was not outside of the Ercanbrack's home, Dr. Alex concluded the source had to be 
one of three fractured pipes located in the crawl space under the Ercanbrack's home. (R. 
at 3852-53; 6698:85-86; 7008:15-16,104-05) Dr. Alex reached his conclusion prior to 
conducting any tests or examination of the fracture surfaces (R. at 6698:84-86), prior to 
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ir estigating or eliminating any other sources within the home or crawl space (R. at 
6698:153-59), and without any understanding or evidence of Oakwood's manufacturing 
process. (R. at 6695:15-18; 6698:83; 7008:82-84) Dr. Alex testified that because of the 
manner in which the pipe was threaded and inserted into the pipe joints, Oakwood had 
forced the pipe into place which caused a latent non full thickness crack to develop in the 
pipe. (R. at 3852-53) Subsequently, some unknown force caused the partial crack to 
develop into a full crack which led to explosion. Dr. Alex, however, stated he has no 
actual knowledge of what subsequent force caused the full thickness crack to form which 
led to the explosion. (R. at 6698:76; 7008:65-66) 
Oakwood brought several motions seeking to exclude Dr. Alex's testimony. 
First, Oakwood filed a iMotion to Exclude Dr. Alex's Opinion Regarding Causation. (R. 
at 3771-72, 3787-3861) This court heard this motion on September 4, 2001, including 
testimony of Dr. Alex. (R. at 6695) The court concluded issues of fact precluded it from 
making a ruling at that time to exclude his testimony. (R. at 6695:70) 
Prior to trial, Oakwood renewed its efforts to preclude Dr. Alex from 
testifying regarding the cause and origin of the explosion. (R. at 5499-5512) On March 
25, 2002, the court conducted a Rimmasch hearing and after Dr. Alex's testimony and the 
argument of counsel, the court concluded it would allow Dr. Alex to testify provided 
certain foundation was set forth by other expert and lay testimony. (R. at 6698:150-52) 
Specifically, the trial court required foundation concerning the migration of propane 
10 
which eliminated a source outside of the Ercanbrack home and foundation regarding how 
Oakwood manufactures the gas piping system in its homes. (R. at 6698:150-52) The 
court ruled if the evidence indicated that Oakwood would not force its pipes into place, it 
would be inclined to strike Dr. Alex's testimony. (R. at 6698:150-52) Although the 
uncontradicted evidence from Oakwood's employees at trial indicated it would not force 
pipes into place as Dr. Alex believed, Dr. Alex was allowed to testify at trial. (R. at 
7004:73-74, 120-21, 156-58,166-67; 7007:278, etseq.) 
On or about January 18, 2002, plaintiff submitted answers to Oakwood's 
Requests for Admissions. (R. at 5887-88) The last two admissions read: 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 12: Admit that you 
reported the explosion to the Summit County Sheriff at 6:05 
p.m. on January 31, 1998 as recorded in the Summit County 
Sheriff LAW Incident Table (a copy of is attached hereto as 
Exhibit 2). 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 12: 
Admit. 
REQUEST OF ADMISSION NO. 13: Admit that 
approximately 50 minutes elapsed between the time you 
discovered the explosion and the time you reported the 
explosion to the Summit County Sheriffs Office. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 13: 
Deny. 
(R. at 6697:24-25, 28) 
During opening statements, Oakwood represented to the jury that certain 
facts were admitted by plaintiff. (R. at 7000:60-61) Specifically, Oakwood relied on the 
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sheriffs log and the admission to show that plaintiff did not call in the explosion until 
6:05 p.m. that night. (R. at 7000:61) On the other hand, plaintiff indicated he arrived at 
his home by approximately 4:45 p.m. (R. at 7000:60-61) After making this opening 
statement, Oakwood learned that plaintiff intended to offer evidence to show the police 
record was incorrect. (R. at 6697:24-27) Furthermore, the evidence plaintiff intended to 
offer had not been disclosed to Oakwood prior to its reliance on the admissions in its 
Opening. (R. at 6697:28-29) After opening statements, the trial court ruled the 
admissions were ambiguous, and plaintiff was entitled to introduce evidence contrary to 
the admission to explain his response to the admission. (R. at 6697:29-30) Based on this 
ruling, plaintiff introduced evidence contrary to the admission. (R .at 7004:39-42; 
7007:257-59) 
After Oakwood relied on the admission in its Opening and presented it to 
the jury as fact, and after the trial court allowed evidence in to contradict the admission, 
plaintiffs counsel used this turn-of-events in his closing argument, stating: 
No. 2 The Time Discrepancy they talked about. Remember, 
they said, gee, we're going to prove to you there was an hour 
out there. Bill was up at that scene. Well, before he called 
911, is that what you got out of the evidence? And just what 
were they trying to imply that Bill did? What were they 
saying? Bill was at the scene for an hour unaccounted for. 
What do you think they were implying? They want to put Bill 
on trial with you because Oakwood's not going to be liable. 
We'll do anything they say in order to escape liability. We'll 
even tell you what Bill did do and imply that something was 
wrong with that. They never proved that, did they? What 
they did was, they changed in mid stream. They made their 
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opening statement and then all of a sudden they changed 
because they had to, because the police officers are like, no, 
that's all wrong. . . . They're clutching at straws. They'll take 
anything in order to make a point with you regardless of what 
it is. 
(R. at 7012:9-10) 
Prior to trial, SS Supply settled with plaintiff, Nevertheless, plaintiffs own 
allegations and admissions indicated SS Supply supplied a defective and unreasonably 
dangerous propane storage tank. (R. at 5159, 5164-69; 5887-88; 6994:24-26). Based on 
plaintiffs admissions, it was conclusively established: 
(1) SS Supply sold a propane storage tank that contained rust 
at the time it was sold (R. at 5887-88; 6994:25); 
(2) The rust in the propane tank caused complete depletion of 
the ethyl mercaptan in the propane (R. at 5887-88; 6994:25); 
(3) The propane tank was defective and unreasonably 
dangerous (R. at 5887-88; 6994:25); 
(4) Traces of propane were found in the blood of plaintiff s 
wife and daughter after the explosion; (R. at 5887-88; 
6994:25) 
In addition to these admissions, plaintiff submitted a statement of 
undisputed facts in a Motion for Summary Judgment against SS Supply. (R. at 2973-78; 
5159; 5164-69) Specifically, plaintiff alleged as undisputed facts that: (1) ethyl mercaptan 
is used to odorize propane and to warn consumers of leaking propane in order to avoid 
injury or death; (2) since at least 1987, it had been known throughout the propane industry 
that rust in tanks caused ethyl mercaptan to oxidize and lose its "distinctly recognizable 
odor;"(3) the propane supplied contained ethyl mercaptan; (4) the rust in the tank would 
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have completely removed the odor within 35 days; (5) SS Supply did not warn the 
Ercanbracks of odor fade; (6) a propane leak occurred on January 31,1998 at the 
Ercanbrack home; (7) propane leaked into the living space of the Ercanbrack home to be 
detectable had the odor not faded; (8) had the Ercanbracks been able to smell propane 
they could have "escaped danger;" and (9) toxicology reports indicated propane was 
present in at least two of the three family members; and (10) tanks containing rust are 
defective products. (R. at 2976-77; 5159; 5167-68) 
Oakwood argued the admissions and allegations of plaintiff conclusively 
established SS Supply was a proximate cause of the accident. As part of its motion for 
summary judgment, Oakwood incorporated all of plaintiff s statement of undisputed 
facts. (R. at 5159) In his reply, plaintiff did not comply with Rule 4-501 of the Rules of 
Judicial Administration and dispute these facts. (R. at 6994::26; 5367-68) Plaintiff merely 
stated it disputed any fact which said SS Supply was the cause of the explosion as the 
explosion and resulting injuries were caused by Oakwood's acts. (R. at 5368) 
On or about September 17, 2001 and prior to a ruling on plaintiffs Motion 
for Summary Judgment against SS Supply, plaintiff settled with SS Supply for 
$3,250,000, and the claims against SS Supply were dismissed. (R. at 4691-93; 6994:30) 
Despite the allegations and admissions on this issue, the court ruled it 
would only instruct the jury that the tank was defective and unreasonably dangerous. (R. 
at 6994:49) The court reserved the issue of whether it would instruct the jury that SS 
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Supply was a proximate cause of the injuries. (R. at 6994:50) In fact Jury instruction 
number 48 only instructed the jury that the tank was defective and unreasonably 
dangerous. (R. at 7011:41-43) The jury was not instructed that SS Supply was a 
proximate cause of injuries. .(R. at 7011:41-43) 
In conjunction with SS Supply's fault and settlement with plaintiff, 
Oakwood requested the jury be informed of the settlement and the amount of the 
settlement. (R. at 6471-6525) Because SS Supply had supplied a defective and 
unreasonably dangerous product as a matter of law and due the large amount of the 
settlement ($3.25 million), Oakwood argued this was a rare instance necessitating 
disclosure of the settlement amount to the jury. The court ruled the jury would be 
instructed that SS Supply had settled, but the amount would not be disclosed to the jury. 
(R. at 6698:19) 
On the issue of causation, Oakwood argued plaintiff had no physical 
evidence and his expert testimony lacked foundation and reliability. (R. at 3864-4018) In 
allowing Dr. Alex's testimony at trial, the trial court also denied the motions for summary 
judgment on causation. (R at 6695:71) On the lack of evidence establishing proximate 
cause, Oakwood renewed its motion at the close of plaintiff s case-in-chief. (R. at 
7008:168) On April 10, 2002, Oakwood presented this motion, and the court denied this 
motion. (R. at 7011:5-17) Finally, in its post-trial motions for J.N.O.V. and related relief, 
Oakwood again argued plaintiff had produced insufficient evidence to prove causation. 
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(R. at 6807-59; 6925-43) These post-trial motions were denied. (R. at 6964-65) 
As briefly alluded to, the trial in this matter started March 28, 2002 and 
proceeded for 12 days, concluding with closing arguments on April 11, 2002. Originally, 
the trial was set for 9 days with plaintiff allocated five days. (R. at 6994:7) As the trial 
progressed, however, it became evident plaintiff would need more than five days to 
present his case-in-chief. On the eighth day of trial on April 5, 2002, the court addressed 
the issue of time. (R. at 7007:217-220) Importantly, the court required the parties to 
complete the trial by April 11th, leaving Oakwood a fraction of the time allotted to 
plaintiff. (R. at 7007:217:220) In the middle of the ninth day of trial, plaintiff rested his 
case-in-chief. (R. at 7008:168) Oakwood was given basically three days to present its 
entire case. (R. at 7008:168 through R. at 7011) Furthermore, on April 8th and 9th, 
Oakwood did not have an entire day to present testimony. (R. at 7008:168, et seq.; 7009) 
On April 11, 2002, each side presented its closing arguments. During 
plaintiffs closing, plaintiffs counsel made numerous inappropriate remarks. First, 
plaintiffs counsel argued the jury should "send a message" to Oakwood and to HUD, 
who regulates manufactured housing, to ensure certain standards are enforced. (R. at 
7012:19) 
Additionally, plaintiffs counsel commented on the credibility of the 
witnesses on this issue. For example, counsel stated: "They say it couldn't have 
happened. It didn't happen. We wouldn't have done it. It did. It happened. Again, 
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you're lying eyes are going to tell you so. Just look at the pipe, listen to the experts." (R. 
at 7012:20-21) During his rebuttal, plaintiffs counsel went so far as to suggest the 
standards are applicable as a matter of law. Specifically, plaintiffs counsel referred to 
the fact that the case was not thrown out is proof that the standards are applicable. (R. at 
7012:69) "If there were no standards that Oakwood had to obey we wouldn't be here. As 
a matter of law then, under the circumstances, this would have been thrown out, we 
wouldn't have been talking about it, because then there would have been no law and Mr. 
Plant would have said, gee, under the circumstances there is no law here, there is no 
applicable law, there is no applicable standards, they proved nothing." (R. at 7012:69-
70) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This appeal presents several issues which individually are discrete legal 
arguments, but as the record indicates, each ruling impacted the other issues. Had some 
of the errors below been isolated, the impact may have been softened, and perhaps, 
harmless. On the other hand, some of the trial court's rulings undermined the trial on 
their own. Collectively, the trial court's rulings on the issues presented in this appeal had 
the effect of precluding a fair trial and resulted in a jury verdict unsupported by Utah law 
and the evidence in the record. Additionally, the amount of the jury's verdict was 
dictated by passion and prejudice rather than an objective view of the evidence. The end 
result was a verdict far in excess of typical jury verdicts in Utah. 
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Specifically, Oakwood has challenged the admissibility of plaintiff s expert, 
Dr. Alex. Dr. Alex's testimony is inadmissible because it is not supported by a proper 
foundation, did rot use a proper scientific methodology and is contrary to facts and 
witness testimony set forth at trial. Without Dr. Alex's testimony, plaintiffs claim fails 
as a matter of law because no causal connection exists to show Oakwood manufactured a 
defective product. On this issue, this court should reverse the trial court and enter a 
judgment in favor of Oakwood as a matter of law. 
If this court determines plaintiff sustained his burden on the issue of 
causation, the trial court also committed other reversible errors which warrant a new trial. 
Specifically, the trial court allowed in evidence contrary to plaintiffs sworn admissions 
after Oakwood had relied on the admissions in its opening statement. The effect of the 
trial court's ruling was extremely prejudicial to Oakwood and alone warrants a new trial. 
Additionally, plaintiffs counsel made prejudicial and inflammatory remarks during 
closing arguments which raised the ire of the jury and lead to an unsupportable verdict 
against Oakwood. Finally, the trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding the 
liability and settlement of a co-defendant who settled prior to trial. The cumulative effect 
of all the errors undermined the jury's verdict, warranting a new trial. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Dr. Alex's Opinion Is Not Supported by Facts in the Record, Witness 
Testimony, Physical Evidence or Scientific Principles and Accordingly 
Does Not Have the Requisite Foundation or Reliability Required for 
Expert Testimony. 
Because Dr. Alex's testimony lacks the requisite foundation and reliability, 
the trial court erred in denying Oakwood's Motion to Exclude his testimony (R. at 
6695:70-71) and in ruling he satisfied the requirements for scientific testimony as set 
forth in State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 397-98 (Utah 1989). (R. at 6698:54,151-52). 
As this court indicated in State v. Rimmasch, "it can be said that evidence not shown to 
be reliable cannot, as a matter of law, 'assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or 
to determine a fact in issue' and, therefore, is inadmissible." W. (quoting Utah R. Evid. 
702). 
More importantly as applied to this case, even if the court determines the 
scientific principles or techniques are inherently reliable, the court must also "make a 
separate determination that there is an adequate foundation for the proposed testimony, 
i.e., that the scientific principles or techniques have been properly applied to the facts of 
the particular case by qualified persons and that the testimony is founded on that work." 
Id. at 398 n.71; see also E.I, du Pont de Nemours and Co., Inc. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 
1
 The trial court's duty under Rule 702 also implicates Rule 403 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence in that it requires a balancing of probativeness versus prejudice. See also 
Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co.. Inc., 781 P.2d 445, 448 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (noting 
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549, 556 (Tex. 1995). 
In a nutshell, Dr. Alex attributes negligence to Oakwood by asserting that 
during the construction of the home Oakwood forced the gas pipes into place, which 
caused a latent non full thickness crack to develop. Later, Dr. Alex states that some 
unidentified force, which he believes may have been thermal expansion and contraction, 
caused the partial crack to develop into a full crack. This crack is the source of the leak 
which caused the explosion. As is set forth below, Dr. Alex's theon suffers from two 
major gaps in logic and evidentiary support: (A) Dr. Alex has no evidence other than the 
explosion and Richard Thatcher's opinions to eliminate other possible sources of the leak; 
and (B) the evidence in the record regarding Oakwood's manufacturing procedure is 
contrary to Dr. Alex's story. 
A. Dr. Alex Has No Basis to Identify the Pipes in the Crawl Space as 
the Source of the Leak. 
Dr. Alex first conceived his story regarding the cause of the explosion in a 
report dated November 30, 2000. (R. at 3852). Although he subsequently modified his 
story to a limited extent, Dr. Alex's story remains essentially the same: 
First accepting the premise that the initial and major 
explosion occurred below the floor of the home in the crawl 
"relevant" expert testimony may still be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice). Accordingly, the more reliable the scientific principles 
and foundation the more probative the testimony is. Expert testimony based on weak 
science or foundation is less probative and should be carefully examined for its 
prejudicial effects. State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 398 n.8 (Utah 1989). 
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space we must agree that there was an escape of propane from 
the piping system below the floor that caused an accumulation 
of propane sufficient to cause an explosion. 
(R. at 3852 (emphasis added)) Dr. Alex relies on Richard Thatcher to eliminate possible 
sources of the explosion. (R. at 6698:85-86; 7008:15-16) Importantly, however, Richard 
Thatcher does not identify or eliminate any sources within the Ercanbrack home as the 
cause of the explosion. Dr. Alex, however, adopts Thatcher's opinion that the gas could 
not have migrated from an outside source and then proceeds to make a speculative leap to 
his premise that one of three fractured pipes recovered after the explosion was the cause. 
(R. at 7008:16, 21) Without investigating or eliminating any other potential sources, Dr. 
Alex identifies the source of the leak and proceeds to make up a stoiy on how it might 
have happened. "An expert who is trying to find a cause of something should carefully 
consider alternative causes." E.I, du Pont de Nemours and Co., Inc. v. Robinson, 923 
S.W.2d 549, 559 (Tex. 1995) 
Thatcher testified that a significant amount of gas accumulated in the crawl 
space beneath the Ercanbrack home. (R. at 7006:38) Both Thatcher and Romig also 
testified that no source existed in the crawl space to ignite the gas and that significant 
amounts of gas had to accumulate in the living space of the Ercanbrack home. (R. at 
7006:193-194; 7007:73 (Thatcher); 7007:182 (Romig)) Thatcher states he believes the 
clothes dryer in the Ercanbrack home provided the ignition source for the explosion. (R. 
at 7006:169-72) Finally, Thatcher eliminates the possibility of a slow leak from the 
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joints of the gas piping system as a possible source. (R. at 7006:77-80) 
Based on the tests he conducted, Thatcher concludes no small leak existed, 
the leak causing the explosion was large and the leak only existed for approximately 
twenty-four hours prior to the explosion. (R. at 7006:172-75) 
Accordingly, nothing in Thatcher or Romig's testimony identifies the three 
fractured pipes recovered after the explosion as the source of the leak that caused the 
explosion. The court allowed Thatcher to testify as to migration of gas and that he 
eliminated the possibility of a small leak from the pipe joints. (R. at 6698:156-57, 159) 
Thatcher, however, is neither a metallurgist nor qualified to do failure analysis (R. at 
6698:153), and accordingly, the court precluded his testimony as to the source of the leak 
or the cause of the leak. (R. at 6698:159) 
The rules of evidence and scientific reasoning do not allow the speculative 
leap made by Dr. Alex. As this court has stated: "the trial court should carefully explore 
each logical link in the chain that leads to the expert testimony given in court and 
determine its reliability/' State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 403 (Utah 1989). In this 
case, it is the first link in the chain that is a problem, as Dr. Alex conclusively determines 
without any foundation, one of the three fractures has to be the source of the leak: 
Second accepting Thatcher's premise that the rate of gas 
escape was fairly large and more than would escape from the 
threaded area of the pipe joints (of which I now have no 
reservations) we must assume that this escape was from a 
broken pipe or joint of which we have three . . . . 
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(R. at 3852 (emphasis added)) The rules of evidence and scientific reasoning do not 
allow assumptions where the assumption is on the ultimate issue, i.e. source and 
causation. 
Dr. Alex's application of failure analysis to the evidence in this case did not 
employ the requisite scientific process to obtain a reliable opinion. Here, Dr. Alex 
admitted he reasoned backwards from the explosion to explain what he believes occurred. 
(R. at 7008:79)2 As this court stated: "'[cjoming to a firm conclusion first and then 
doing research to support it is the antithesis of [science].'" Brewer v. Denver & Rio 
Grande Western R.R., 2001 UT 77, ^ 27, 31 P.3d 557 (citation omitted); see also E.I, du 
Pont de Nemours and Co., Inc. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 559 (Tex. 1995). In 
Brewer, defendant challenged plaintiffs expert's conclusion that workplace conditions 
caused plaintiff to develop Carpel Tunnel Syndrome. See Brewer, 2001 UT 77 at 1ffi27-
31. Defendant argued plaintiffs expert reached his conclusion before conducting the 
proper analysis. See id. at J^27. First, the court set forth the steps used in conducting the 
NIOSH methodology to determine the cause of a medical problem. See id. at %21. In 
affirming the trial court's decision to allow the expert's testimony, this court noted the 
2
 Additionally, Dr. Alex was repeatedly questioned on what evidence he had to 
support his conclusions. Dr. Alex stated he knew something failed to have caused the 
explosion, so from a scientific standpoint it had to be one of the three pipes recovered 
after the explosion. (R. at 6698:66-78; 7008:15-16) When asked by the court what 
evidence exists to support his opinion, Dr. Alex states: "First of all, we know we had an 
explosion and it's tied to the house." (R. at 6698:71-72) 
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evidence in the record which indicated the expert had followed the required steps and 
which supported his methodology: 
[I]t is clear from the record that the trial court possessed a 
sufficient foundation to determine that Dr. Harrison had in 
fact properly applied the fifth step of the 1979 NIOSH 
methodology to the facts of Brewer's case by first examining 
his medical records; assessing and observing the relevant risk 
factors, including posture; ruling out any possible 
nonoccupational causes; and then coming to his ultimate 
conclusion. 
Id. at ^[28. This court went on to note that plaintiffs expert "possessed detailed 
information" and had examined several photographs before arriving at his conclusions. 
See id. at f 29. Importantly, the court found a sufficient factual foundation existed for the 
expert's opinions and that he had properly eliminated other possible causes. See id. at 
1N27-29. 
Like the NIOSH methodology, failure analysis requires certain steps; these 
steps include: 1) description of the failure situation; 2) visual examination; 3) mechanical 
design analysis (stress analysis); 4) chemical design analysis; 5) fractography; 6) 
metallographic examination; 7) identification of properties pertinent to the design; and 8) 
failure simulation. See Charlie R. Brooks and Ashok Choudhury, Metallurgical Failure 
Analysis 5-6 (1993). In arriving at a properly supported conclusion, all expert opinions, 
whether using NIOSH, failure analysis or other methodology should be formed like a 
pyramid with "a large foundation of facts and evidence at the bottom, which support a 
few conclusions at the top." Randall Noon, Engineering Analysis of Fires and Explosions 
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2(1995). 
In contrast to Brewer's expert, Dr. Alex concluded it had to be one of the 
three fractured pipes based on the circumstantial coincidence that three pipes located after 
the explosion had been fractured. Dr. Alex did not review any literature on causes of 
explosions or any literature linking deviations from ANSI or ASME standards to propane 
explosions, review or observe Oakwood's manufacturing process for its homes, analyze 
the fracture surfaces with a scanning electron microscope or otherwise document the 
surfaces of the fractured ] >pe to show how it was consistent with his conclusions, 
determine the possible causes of the explosion and eliminate other possible causes. (R. at 
3852-53; 4265, 4321-27; 6695:16-17; 6698:15-18, 64-78, 82-83; 7008:15-16, 81-84; 
7010:82) In fact, one cause and origin expert used Dr. Alex's methodology as a text book 
example of faulty reasoning: 
For example, consider the following case. It is true 
that propane gas systems are involved in some explosions and 
fires. A particular house that was equipped with a propane 
system sustained an explosion and subsequent fire. The 
epicenter of the explosion, the point of greatest explosive 
pressure, was located in a basement room which contained the 
propane furnace. From this information, the investigator 
concludes that the explosion and fire was caused by the 
propane system and in particular, the furnace. 
However, the investigator's conclusion is based on 
faulty logic. There is not sufficient information to firmly 
conclude that the propane system was the cause of the 
explosion, despite the fact that the basic facts and the 
generalized principle upon which the conclusion is based are 
all true. 
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Noon, at 3. The text goes on to note that statistically most propane systems are reliable 
which requires additional investigation before a connection can be made linking the 
propane system to the explosion. Id. In other words, from a purely statistical viewpoint, 
it is more likely than not that the propane system did not cause the explosion, id. This 
fact is verified by the HUD standards and research which show that propane systems 
which are manufactured to be gas tight are reliable. (R. at 7009:144) Therefore, the test 
to determine whether a propane system complies with applicable standards is to determine 
if it passes a pressure test rather than counting the number of threads.3 
In addition to being criticized by his scientific peers, the reasoning used by 
Dr. Alex has been uniformly criticized and rejected by courts: "That inference turns 
scientific analysis on its head. Instead of reasoning from known facts to reach a 
conclusion, the experts here reasoned from an end result in order to hypothesize what 
needed to be known but was not." Stibbs v. MAPCO, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 1220, 1224 (S.D. 
Iowa 1996) (excluding expert who employed differential diagnosis to eliminate possible 
causes until only one remained); see also Brewer, 2001 UT 77 at 1H[21, 28 
(acknowledging the need to rule out other possible causes); Indiana Michigan Power Co. 
v. Runge, 717 N.E.2d 216, 235 (Ind. 1999) ("the most troubling aspect of [plaintiff s 
expert's] testimony [on causation] is his failure to consider other causes of the accident in 
3
 Plaintiffs own expert testified the threading and insertion of the pipes into the 
joints did not cause the system to leak. (R. at 7006:77-80,172-75) 
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forming his opinion. . . ."). 
In this case, Dr. Alex arrived at his conclusion first and did not investigate, 
let alone eliminate, other possible causes of the explosion. His opinion that one of the 
three fractured pipes was the source of the propane leak is nothing more than speculation. 
B. Dr. Alex's Testimony Is Directly Contrary to the Facts In Evidence 
and Accordingly Should Have Been Excluded. 
Dr. Alex's story is purely speculative as to Oakwood's manufacturing 
procedures and directly contrary to the witness testimony introduced at trial by plaintiff. 
In allowing Dr. Alex's testimony, the trial court required certain factual foundation. 
Specifically, the trial court demanded Thatcher and Romig's testimony eliminating an 
outside source for the leak and testimony that Oakwood's manufacturing procedures were 
such that it had no procedures to correct any alignment problems if it arose. During the 
Rimmasch hearing, the following discussion occurred: 
Court: I am focusing quite a bit on source of gas 
migration, but certainly there has to be evidence too. I mean, 
if the only evidence is that [Oakwood would] adapt, 
[Oakwood would] drill a different hole, where is the evidence 
before us? 
Mr. Plant: Right. 
Court: Lacking that, there's no basis for the rest of the 
argument. That has to be there too. 
Mr. Plant: You should know this, your Honor. His initial 
thing was we put these things up to the floor first, so we had 
to bring it up vertical. That's where we did it. He abandoned 
that. 
Now, in his deposition he says, if we drilled the 
hold instead of forcing it, this doesn't work too. I can show 
you in his deposition where he says that. So there's other 
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things. But the point is he has to come in and say, we didn't 
drill the hole, he has to come in and say, here's the evidence 
to support my opinion, and absent that, it's just sheer 
speculation, as to causation. Again, very limited, as to this 
pipe breaking. 
Court: I understand. You know, one thing I have 
appreciated from both of you, your motions have focused on 
specific things. They are about, you are accepting what you 
don't think there is a real argument about and you have 
focused. So I do understand that, you've both done that, but 
I've heard your argument, I've wrestled with it, I did not even 
make a preliminary determination before hearing this 
evidence today, but I think we are past the gatekeeper 
function for Dr. Alex. I think he can testify, provided the 
factual predicate's in there through other testimony. And it 
could conceivably get to a point that evidence that we're told 
we will hear, if it doesn't come in, I will strike Dr. Alex. I 
know that would worry you because striking evidence isn't 
always effective, but it would be what I would do if the 
evidence does not stack up as I'm told it will. That is 
evidence on migration or failure of migration, evidence on the 
installation. If the only evidence, for example, that comes in 
is that we adapt we drill extra holes, we never force it, well 
that's a big hole and I think we'd have to strike his 
conclusions, but it's got to come in that way. So I'm denying 
your motion to exclude his evidence on causation at this time. 
(R. at 6698:150-52 (emphasis added)). 
At trial, plaintiff introduced the deposition testimony of four Oakwood 
employees to lay the foundation for Oakwood's manufacturing procedures. The 
testimony unequivocally showed that Oakwood would unstrap or jiggle the pipe or redrill 
the hole if the hole and the pipe did not match up properly. (R. at 7004:73-74 (Julie 
Meek); 7004:120-21 (James Jackson); 7004:156-158,166-67 (Richard Gibson)) None of 
the Oakwood employees testified that pipes were forced into place if the pipes did not 
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line up properly. (R. at 7004:73-74 (Julie Meek); 7004:120-21 (James Jackson); 
7004:156-158,166-67 (Richard Gibson)) In addition, Oakwood, in support of an early 
motion to exclude Dr. Alex's testimony, offered the affidavit of another employee who 
also corroborated the manufacturing methods. (R. at 3855-57 (Mark Ezzo))4 
At trial, plaintiff introduced no testimony to establish the necessary 
foundation for Dr. Alex's story. Instead, plaintiff attempted to have Dr. Alex comment 
on the credibility of the witness testimony to establish what he believed to be the actual 
process Oakwood used to manufacture plaintiffs home. (R. at 7008:36-37) Without any 
proof (other than his calculations of pipe distances), Dr. Alex speculates that Oakwood 
would force the pipe into place. (R. at 7008:36-37; 62-63) 
In addition to being contrary to the testimony regarding manufacturing 
procedures, Dr. Alex's testimony also ignores the governing standards. Dr. Alex relies on 
ANSI and AS ME threading standards to establish an alleged defect because in his view 
this standard applies to all pipe used in homes. (R. at 7007:234-238) Dr. Alex has no 
knowledge where these standards were adopted by HUD as a standard for gas pipes (R. at 
4
 At trial, Dr. Alex suggested the testimony of the Oakwood employees was 
inconsistent and not credible. The testimony, however, is not inconsistent. Each 
employee unequivocally testified the risers would not be forced. No force is necessary 
because various methods are available to accommodate any variations in the length of the 
pipe. Specifically, the pipe could be moved or the hole redrilled. (R. at 7004:73-74; 
7004:156-58, 166-67) Dr. Alex conceded he had no idea where the hole was drilled and 
the employee's testimony did not corroborate his opinion. (R. at 6698:82-83; 7008:81-
84) 
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7007:239), but rather relies on Michael Slifka's prior deposition testimony as a basis. (R. 
at 7007:239-249) Mr. Slifka, however, testified that the standards are referenced in the 
HUD stan^1 ds and used as guidelines. (R. at 7007:282-83) Importantly, however, the 
HUD standards reference hundreds of other standards, but it does not enforce every 
standard that it references. (R. at 7007:283-87) The governing standard is the propane 
system must not leak. If the gas system passes the pressure test, the system passes the 
HUD regulations. (R. at 7010:61-62, 65-66) 
A major component-and a serious defect in-Dr. Alex's story is it assumes 
the piping system is rigid and fixed at two points with no ability to be moved to 
accommodate any deviation from precise measurements. (R. at 6698:118-20; 7008:57-
60) Dr. Alex calculates the distances for the pipe as assembled for the Ercanbrack home 
and concludes it is short from the required measurement by one and 5/16 inches. (R. at 
6698:116; 7008:55) Assuming two fixed points in the piping system, Dr. Alex runs a 
test which indicates it takes over 70 pounds of force to get the range riser to line up 
properly. (R. at 6698:122; 7008:45) Based on this amount of force and results from 
prior bend tests, Dr. Alex speculates Oakwood cracked the pipes in making it fit. (R. at 
6698:122-23; 7008:54-55) 
The undisputed testimony, however, is the pipe is only secured by flexible 
straps and it can be moved to allow the range riser to be inserted without force. (R. at 
7004:156-158) Additionally, even if the pipes were not moved, the testimony is the hole 
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would be redrilled if it did not line up properly. (R. at 7004:166-67) hi tact, Dr. Alex 
conceded he had no evidence to support his story that Oakwood would force the pipes in 
place: 
Mr. Plant: Do >ou have any evidence that in 
Fort Morgan, Colorado, at the time this home 
was built that there was excessive pressure put 
on this pipe? 
Dr. Alex: Other than it failed? 
Mr. Plant' Vm asking for evidence [ . . .] 
Dr. Alex: No, I don't [ ] 
Mr. Plant: Not your conclusions. 
Dr. Alex: I don't. And nobody does. 
(R. at 6698:83) 
In addition to the evidence offered by Oakwood's employees, an 
independent third party witness corroborated Oakwood's testimony that it would not force 
pipes into pi uv. John Bailey an employee of Summit Propane testified he visually 
examined the gas piping system at the Ercanbrack home as part of his duties w hen he 
hooked the system to the propane tank. (R. at 7009:29-30) Mi. Bailey did not observe 
any irregularities or observe the range riser was coming out of the floor at an unusual or 
peculiar angle as would he consistent with hi Alex's story/ (R il /OO^MO) None of the 
Oakwood employees had any independent recollection of the Ercanbrack house. 
If Dr. Alex's story was correct, the range riser would come up through the floor 
at an angle. (R. at 7008:62-63) If the range riser is perpendicular to the floor, it would 
not put any force on the riser. Dr. Alex's story requires the pipe to be manipulated to put 
in excess of 70 pounds of force onto the riser. Later, Dr. Alex speculates some other 
unknow n force places enough additional force onto the riser to allow it to fully crack. 
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Accordingly, Mr. Bailey's testimony is the only direct eyewitness testimony concerning 
the Ercanbrack home.6 
Consistent with the witness testimony, the only objective evidence as to the 
quality of the gas piping system in the Ercanbrack home also suggested Oakwood 
properly manufactured the home. All parties, witnesses and experts agree the gas piping 
system did not leak when it left Oakwood's Colorado manufacturing facility (R. at 
7004:106,124); did not leak when it arrived at the Ercanbrack's home site (R. at 
7006:82); did not leak when Summit propane hooked the pipe system to the propane tank 
(R. at 7006:82); and did not leak after the explosion with the exception of the four 
fracture points.7 (R. at 7006:77, 80-82; 7007:31-33). More importantly, the Ercanbrack's 
lived in the home for five months without incident prior to the explosion. (R. at 7000:13) 
Expert witnesses are not allowed to speculate about facts or disregard facts 
in the record in order to make the causal link. "An expert opinion cannot sustain a jury's 
verdict when it 'is not supported by sufficient facts to validate it in the eyes of the law, or 
when indisputable record facts contradict or otherwise render the opinion unreasonable . . 
6
 Plaintiff offered no testimony to indicate the range riser came through the floor 
at an angle or in any peculiar manner. Plaintiff had the opportunity to observe both the 
piping under the floor of the home prior to the construction of cinder block skirting (R. 
at 7001:245-46) and the range riser in the living area of the home. Nevertheless, plaintiff 
testified he did not see the range riser prior to the explosion. (R. at 7001:243) 
7
 Dr. Alex admits that all the fractures could have occurred in the explosion. (R. at 
6698:65, 69, 84; 7008:101) 
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. .'" Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1057 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(quoting Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 242, 
113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993)^ ' this case, the uncontradicted testimony does not support Dr. 
Alex's story. 
In J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 243 ]: " - ^ ir. 
2001), the plaintiff offered the testimony of an accident reconstruction expert whose 
testimony was based largely on review of photographs. The court excluded plaintiffs 
accident reconsn M >n expert where 1lis opinioii derived from his review of the 
photographs conflicted with uncontradicted eyewitness testimony and he admitted he 
lacked sufficient information to scientifically reconstract the accident. See id. at 443. In 
this case, Dr. Alex's opinion conflicts with all witness testimony. In fact, Dr. Alex 
conceded the Oakwood employees' testimony did not support his story that the pipe 
would be forced. ^IL at 7008:82) At trial, the following dialogue occurred: 
Mr M^;i w: Now, what is the testimony of Oakwood's 
people-let me ask you, isn't true that it is the testimony of 
Oakwood people that if, in fact, the hole doesn't match up 
they drill a new hole? 
Dr. Alex: That's their testimony. 
(R. at 7008:82, see also 6698:83) 
In this case, Dr. Alex heard the testimony of the Oakwood employees 
regarding the manufacturing procedures. Dr. Alex, however, suggests that those 
procedures were not followed in this case. nu<vi:;'•:.-84) In Jetcraft Corp. v. Flight 
Safety Int'h the 10th Circuit excluded the human factors expert who offered expert 
opinion that contradicted the pilot's statement of what happened during a plane crash, 
stating: "to come in after the fact as in this case and to take into account contrary denials 
[by the pilot] and, in the absence of any evidence from the plaintiff as to what he did, to 
opine that the event was the inadvertent retraction [of the landing gear] by [the pilot] is 
just professional speculation." Jetcraft Corp. v. Flight Safety Int'L, 16 F.3d 362, 366 
(10th Cir. 1993) (excluding expert's testimony on what pilot might have done to cause 
crash). Furthermore, the trial court sustained an objection when Dr. Alex attempted to 
comment on the Oakwood employee's testimony. (R. at 7008:36-37) 
The only evidence produced regarding Oakwood's manufacturing 
procedures and the condition of the Ercanbrack's home when it was hooked to the 
propane source contradicted Dr. Alex's opinion. 
C. Oakwood Offered Scientific Evidence Refuting the Scientific Basis 
for Much of Dr. Alex's Story. 
In an attempt to bolster his opinion, Dr. Alex, and plaintiffs other experts, 
conducted a series of tests to refute testing or opinions first offered by defendants in the 
case. Each of these tests, however, is isolated to a particular component of Dr. Alex's 
story, is only undertaken after a test or theory is offered by defendants, yields 
inconclusive results, is not tied to facts in the record and cannot be combined to replicate 
or reproduce the cause of the explosion. In reviewing expert testimony and methodology, 
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courts have noted that Rule 702 requires specialized knowledge. Accordingly, it is 
important to ensure expert testimony offered at trial is reliable. Because the jury tends to 
regard experts as more credible, an expert offering scientific testimony "'may sway a jury 
even when as science it is palpably wrong.'" E.I, du Pont de Nemours and Co., Inc. v. 
Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 553 (Tex. 1995) (citation omitted). Accordingly, expert 
scientific testimony must be derived by the scientific method and be supported by 
appropriate validation or good grounds. See Pride v. BIC Corp., 218 1.3d 566, 577-78 
(6th Cir. 2000) (excluding pl-unlilT^ fulmv analysis expert who offered opinion as to 
how lighter leaked and exploded). As set forth below, Dr. Alex neither followed accepted 
scientific methods nor validated any of his assertions. 
Dr vlex calculated the pipe would be 1 5/16M too short. (R. at 7008:51) 
Additionally, Dr. Alex conducted bend tests to verify his conclusion that overthreaded 
and underinserted pipe as found on the range riser would be weakc 'h>>'• ne threaded in 
strict accordance with the ANSI and ASME standards. (R. at 6698:122-124; 7008:59-60) 
Finally, Dr. Alex concluded the force necessary to get the shortened pipe lined up with 
hole in the floor w excess of 7< nds offerer M^W I :,;,» Neither of these 
8
 "'The word "knowledge" connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported 
speculation.' The testimony here lacks the support to rise above speculation because it 
remains untested in many important aspects." Stibbs v. MAPCCX Inc., 945 F. Supp. 1220, 
1224 (S.D. Iowa 1996) (citation omitted). "It is also important to consider whether an 
expert's processes and conclusions can be verified by subsequent, independent testing for 
'falsibility, or refutability . . . .'" Id. (citations omitted). 
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tests, however, are evidence that Oakwood would have forced the pipes into place. 
Additionally, Dr. Alex never inserted the risers through the holes to see if he could 
achieve a non full thickness crack by forcing the riser into the mis-aligned pipe below. 
(R. at 7008:52-55) 
Instead of trying to simulate his story through one complete experiment to 
test its validity, Dr. Alex conducted individual tests to prove isolated elements of his story 
were plausible. For example, Dr. Alex bent pipes to determine the difference in the 
amount of force it would take to bend pipe properly threaded and inserted as compared to 
the pipe as manufactured in the Ercanbrack home. Dr. Alex concluded it was possible to 
crack the properly threaded and inserted pipe at about 80 pounds of force and that the 
over-threaded and under-inserted pipe was weaker than properly threaded and inserted 
pipe. (R. at 6698:124; 7008:59-60) 
Based on these separate tests, Dr. Alex concluded it would be possible to 
crack the pipe if the hole and pipe did not properly align. (R. at 6698:124) Dr. Alex, 
however, did not combine the two tests to determine if he could actually crack the pipe in 
trying to force it into position. (R. at 7008:65) Furthermore, the test regarding the 
amount of force necessary to get the pipe into position assumed the piping was connected 
at two points. As the testimony at trial indicated, however, such an assumption is 
contrary to Oakwood's manufacturing process. (R. at 7004:156-158; 166-67) As such, 
the bending and force tests did little to shed light on what actually happened. The tests 
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are after-the-fact tests done to corroborate a preconceived story rather than to determine 
what happened. 
In contrast, David Moore replicated the force and deflection in the piping. 
(R. at 7011:80-93) Because the syste- i^id as I tkes 
significantly more force and a tremendous amount of deflection in order to get enough 
force to crack a piece of the pipe. (R. at 7011:93) The system acts like a spring because it 
is not rigidly fixed. (tc„ .11 '/ill 1 ;*8) Accordingly, the pipe would crack at some other 
point rather than at the range riser as ! •'.») 
Next, Dr. Alex's examination of the fracture surface vio^^l inconclusive 
results. All of the experts agreed the fracture surface was consistent with a one time 
fracture caused by a single event, such as an explosion. (R. at 6698:65, 69, 84; 7008:101 
(Dr. Ah'M ii-uI'lM) i 1 1 I hatchet) ill 1 ,i» I (Moore)) T . Alex testified from a 
metallurgic standpoint it was impossible t ! : w i n p ' ^ ?1K."P1O the 
three fractures. (R. at 6698:84) In other words, all experts agreed the explosion had 
enough force to cause all the fractures in the gas piping system, and the fracture surfaces 
were consistent with an explosion. (R. at 6698:65). Accordingly, the evidence on the 
fracture surface did not support Dr. Alex's theory of a two-step cracking process in the 
pipe. 
Dr. Alex, however, testified he would not expect to see any evidence of a 
latent non full thickness crack. (!•<!, ,i( oii^ N: '4 /t)i)Ki.!;\ J I) In fact, Dr. Alex did not 
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even examine the fracture surface under a scanning electron microscope because he was 
certain he would not see any evidence on the fracture surfaces. (R. at 6695:37; 7008:26) 
Dr. Alex did not run any tests to determine whether it was possible to achieve a non full 
thickness crack, nor did he achieve a non full thickness crack to demonstrate the fracture 
surface would be consistent with the three fractures found after the explosion. (R. at 
7008:65)9 
As support for his story, Dr. Alex relied on a test done by Oakwood's 
expert, David Moore, to show it was possible to get a non full thickness crack. (R. at 
6698:134-35; 7008:65; 7011:93) David Moore testified in real life circumstances, 
however, it is nearly impossible to start a fracture of a pipe and then have the force 
stopped in a manner to prevent a full crack from occurring. (R. at 7011:93-96) 
Additionally, David Moore stated the only reason he was able to get this kind of crack 
was he was using a machine to apply the force. (R. at 7011:93-94) Naturally occurring 
forces do not have the ability to immediately sense the failure and immediately stop 
applying force. (R. at 7011:94-95) David Moore unequivocally stated he did not think it 
was possible to get a non full thickness crack in the Ercanbrack piping. 
In further support of his conclusion that the evidence did not support a 
9
 Dr. Alex did leave some fractured pipes in his basement to show that the pipes 
would not oxidize to any significant degree which would be noticeable. (R. at 7008:31-
35) As a result of this test, Dr. Alex concluded what he already believe was in fact the 
case, i.e. that no arrest lines would be visible. (R. at 7008:35) 
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latent pre-crack, David Moore analyzed the fracture surface of the recovered pipe from 
the Ercanbrack home. (R. <if 7011; 18-76) Unlike Dr. Alex, David Moore applied 
scientific principles and used a scanning electron microscope to examine the fracture 
surfaces on the three fractures i it idei 1:1 i.c i lome and Holographs of the 
fractures to document his analysis. (R. at 7011:49-56) 
Exhibits 250 and 252 are magnified photographs of the fracture surface of 
the range riser, which Dr. Alex identified as the most likely source of a pre-explosion non 
full thickness crack • " '- i ^ r • M The magnified photographs of the 
fracture surface of the range riser indicated dimpling all over the surface. (H if "(> I I > I 
The dimples result from excessive overload forces well above fatigue forces. (R. at 
70 I 1 :!>'!) In addition to the dimples, the fracture surface had no signs of any progressive 
cracking, that is a crack that starts and stops at various stages. (R, at 7011:64) Based on 
this examination of the range riser, David Mooh * 1 any evidence of a pre-
existing crack from the manufacturing process. (R. at 7011:65) David Moore's 
examination of the fracture surface indicated it was a one time event that caused the 
fracture. (! . Tith respect to each of the three fracture surfaces, David 
Moore concluded each was inconsistent with a pre-existing crack and consistent with a 
10
 The fact that the fractures could have been caused by the explosion itself is 
agreed to by all experts in this case. (R. at 6698:65, 69, 84; 7008:109 (Alex); 7007:31 
(Thatcher)) 
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one time crack from an explosion.11 (R. at 7011:66) 
Finally, Dr. Alex has no idea what force actually caused the alleged non full 
thickness crack to become a full thickness crack. (R. at 6698:76; 7008:65-66). Dr. Alex 
believes thermal expansion and contraction is the most probable subsequent force to 
cause the full crack to develop. (R. at 6698:75-76; 7008:65) Dr. Alex, however, 
conducted no tests to determine if thermal expansion and contraction could yield enough 
force to finally crack the pipe. (R. at 6698:76) 
Dr. Alex did not try to replicate or test his theory about what happened. His 
isolated after-the-fact tests were done merely to bolster his story not test or prove it. As 
the Texas Supreme Court discussed: "Assuming [Dr. Alex] was correct, he has offered 
nothing to suggest that what he believes could have happened actually did happen. His 
opinions are little more than 'subjective belief or unsupported speculation.'" Gammill v. 
Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 728 (Tex. 1998) (emphasis in original). 
On the other hand, Oakwood's expert, David Moore examined the fracture 
surface and found contrary evidence to Dr. Alex's story and assumption about what 
would be seen on the fracture surface. See Pride v. BIC Corp., 218 F.3d 566, 578 (6th 
Cir. 2000) (excluding plaintiffs failure analysis expert because expert had failed to 
conduct timely tests to validate his theory and noting defendant's expert had conducted 
11
 One of the fracture surfaces could not be adequately cleaned to allow any 
analysis of the cause of the fracture. (R. at 7011:66) 
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tests which contradicted plaintiffs expert's theory). When Dr. Alex's story is examined 
for what it is, it becomes evident that his story is nothing more than a series of 
assumptions and unfounded conclusions stacked on one another without any scientific 
methodology or reasoning ;< • fs -i ' ; excluding his 
testimony at trial. 
II. If this Court Believes Dr. Alex's Testimony Was Not "Novel" Scientific 
Testimony Requiring a Rimmasch Hearing, This Court Should Adopt the 
Reasoning of United States Supreme Court and Require All Expert 
Testimony to Meet Certain Minimum Requirements for Reliability. 
As set forth above, Dr. Alex's testimony is inherently unreliable. The trial 
court conducted a Rimmasch hearing to determine if his testimony was sufficiently 
reliable as novel scientific testimony. Conceivably, this court could determine that Dr. 
Alex's theory was not novel scientific testimony subject to Rimmasch. See Patey v. 
Lainhart 1999 UT 31, [^16, 977 P.2d 11 v^. i ; • -•< • >rt determines Dt Alex's faihire 
analysis is not testimony founded on novel scientific theories or principles, Oakwood 
requests this court adopt a standard under Rule 702 that applies a Rimmasch standard of 
reliability to all expert testimony. The application of a reliability standard to all expert 
testimony should be a flexible standard dependent on the case and the expert. 
For example, in this case, the court would not need to inquire into the 
qualifications of the expert or the general acceptance of failure analysis. The court's 
inquiry would be whether D< wed accepted practice in conducting a failure 
analysis and whether he used sound methodology to MI 11\ t il In > uinclusions. 
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Recently, the United States Supreme Court determined that its standard for 
reliability in Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993) applied to all 
expert testimony, not just scientific or technical testimony. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. 
Carmichael 526 U.S. 137, 148-49, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1174-75 (1999) (holding Rule 702 of 
Fed. R. of Evid. with "respect to all such matters, 'establishes a standard of evidentiary 
reliability.'"). In determining certain reliability standards, as set forth in Daubert, applied 
to all expert testimony, the court examined the language of Rule 702, which states: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Federal R. Evid. 702 (upon which the Utah rule is modeled and is in fact identical).12 
Examining Rule 702, the U.S. Supreme Court noted the "language makes no relevant 
distinction between 'scientific' knowledge and 'technical' or 'other specialized' 
knowledge. It makes clear that any such knowledge might become the subject of expert 
testimony. In Daubert, the Court specified that it is the Rule's word 'knowledge,' not the 
words (like 'scientific') that modify that word, that 'establishes a standard of evidentiary 
reliability.'" Kumho, 526 U.S. at 147, 119 S. Ct. at 1174. Similarly, this court discussed 
in State v. Rimmasch the same principle: "it can be said that evidence not shown to be 
12
 In response to Daubert and Kumho, federal rule 702 was amended in 2000 to 
add additional language reflecting those opinions. The Utah rule has not been amended 
to contain the new language. 
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reliable cannot, as a matter of law, 'assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue' and, therefore, is inadmissible." Id, 775 P.2d 388, 397-98 
(Utah 1989) (qu ..- i ..n ^ vid. 702). Accordingly, Rimmasch and Rule 702 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence support the reasoning a^n i ie U.5. S» i 
Kumho. 
Other courts that have examined the issue have similarly held that all 
experts si- "iM meet certain standards of reliability before they are allowed to testify at 
trial. Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Kumho, tfic Texas Supreme Court 
was confronted with the same issue. In E.L du Pont de Nemours and Co., Inc. v. 
Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995), the Texas Supreme Court using a substantially 
similar analysis to Kumho ruled tint ill expert testimony was subject to a reliability 
standard. See id. at 556. Shortly, after Robinson, the Texas Supreme Coin I. reaffirmed its 
decision that nothing in Rule 702 limits reliability to only novel scientific testimony. See 
Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d713, 720-21 (Tex. 1998).13 
13
 Texas and the federal courts are not alone in applying a threshold standard to all 
expert testimony. Several other states have expressly adopted the standard announced in 
Kumho and applied it to all expert testimony. See Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. 
Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575 (Ky. 2000) (adopting Kumho standard for all expert testimony 
in Kentucky); Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Chrysler Corp., 2002 WL 1772925, *6-7 (La. 
Ct. App. 3rd Cir. 2002) (applying Kumho standard to non-scientific expert testimony and 
excluding expert's opinions); Adeola v. Kemmerly, 822 So. 2d 722, 727 (La. Ct. App. 1st 
Cir. 2002); Days Cove Reclamation Co. v. Queen Anne's County, 2002 WL 31011262, 
*9 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) ("An expert opinion 'derives its probative force from the 
facts on which it is predicated, and these must be legally sufficient to sustain the opinion 
of the expert.'"). Additionally, other states which have not adopted the federal standard 
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in addition to the language of Rule 702 which suggests it should be applied 
across the board to all experts, other considerations also support applying Rimmasch in 
some form to all expert testimony. First, the determination of what constitutes "novel" 
scientific testimony subject to Rimmasch versus "pedestrian" scientific testimony is a fine 
line. As the court recognized in Kumho: "There is no clear line that divides one from the 
others. Disciplines such as engineering rest upon scientific knowledge. Pure scientific 
theory itself may depend for its development upon observation and properly engineered 
machinery. And conceptual efforts to distinguish the two are unlikely to produce clear 
legal lines capable of application in particular cases." Id. at 148, 119 S. Ct. at 1174. As 
discussed above the language of Rule 702 does not distinguish between the various types 
of expert testimony: "It would be an odd rule of evidence that insisted that some expert 
opinions be reliable but not others. All expert testimony should be shown to be reliable 
before it is admitted." Gammill 972 S.W.2d at 726. 
in Daubert have similarly applied their own standard in a manner consistent with Kumho 
to all expert testimony. See Commonwealth v. Montanez, 769 N.E.2d 784, 795-96 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 2002) (applying Massachusetts standard in Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 641 
N.E.2d 1342 (Mass. 1994) and Kumho standard to expert testimony); Kemp v. State, 
2002 WL 1901333 (N.J. 2002) (New Jersey has a similar standard to Daubert as set forth 
in Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp., 593 A.2d 733 (N.J. 1991) which it applies 
consistent with Kumho); Taylor v. Abernethy, 560 S.E.2d 233, 239-40 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2002) (North Carolina has adopted its own standard in State v. Goode, 461 S.E.2d 631 
(N.C. 1995) which is based on Daubert and interpreted consistently with Kumho); State v. 
Stevens, 78 S.W.3d 817, 832-34 (Tenn. 2002) (Tennessee has its own case standard as set 
forth in McDaniel v. CSX Trans., Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257 (Tenn. 1997) which this opinion 
applies to all expert testimony). 
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Second, and perhaps most importantly, relying on the jury to assess an 
expert's methodology and the validity of her/his opinions is contrary to the requirements 
of expert testimony ami contrary to common sense. As discussed, expert witnesses offer 
scientific, technical or specialized test; - \JV»: r •• Vi. <LV ic-tifv 
in order to assist the jury in determining what happened. Without reliability standards in 
place, an expert may not be of any assistance to the jury and will confuse the jury. By its 
very nature, expert testimony is outside the ken of the jury. 
If this court determines that Dr. Alex's testimony was nc-1 r c! scientific 
testimony subject to Rimmasch, Oakwood requests this court extend Rimmasch and hold 
that all expert testimony meet certain threshold reliability standards in order to be 
admissible. As set forth in poir I above, Dr. Alex's testimony fails to meet even the 
most relaxed standards of reliability. Under this stai idai cl Di Alex's testin tot iv should be 
excluded. 
III. Plaintiff Failed to Show Oakwood's Acts Proximately Caused the 
Explosion and Resulting Injuries. 
The trial court erred in denying ( < IN A ood's pre-trial Motions for Summary 
Judgment, its Motion for a Directed Verdict and its Post-trial Motion for J.N (>.V. 
because plaintiffs evidence regarding the proximate cause was insufficient as a matter of 
law and required the jury to speculate. It is well settled: "The party with the burden of 
proof does not make an issue for the jury's determination Kin? on the hope that the 
jury will not trust the credibility of the witnesses. If all of the witnesses deny thai an 
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event essential to the plaintiffs case occurred , the plaintiff cannot get to the jury simply 
because the jury might believe these denials. There must be some affirmative evidence 
that the event occurred." 9A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 
2527, at 288. In this case, the event essential to plaintiffs case is that Oakwood would 
force the gas pipes into place and in the process crack one of the pipes.14 
In order to establish its case against Oakwood, plaintiff had to show: "c( 1) 
that the [manufactured home] was unreasonably dangerous due to a defect or defective 
condition; (2) that the defect existed at the time the product was sold, and (3) that the 
defective condition was a cause of the plaintiffs injuries. '*' Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle 
14
 Oakwood acknowledges that in challenging a denial of a directed verdict or 
J.N.O.V. determination, it has a duty to marshal the evidence in support of the plaintiffs 
case. See Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R., 2001 UT 77,^33, 31 P.3d 557. 
In this case, Oakwood, as it did at trial, concedes the pipe was overthreaded in some 
places and it was over or underinserted into some of the pipe joints. The rest of plaintiff s 
theory is that because of this threading and insertion, the pipe was shortened by one and 
five-sixteenth inches. (R. at 7008:51) Based on the threading and insertion identified in 
the piping, plaintiff relied on Dr. Alex's testimony to explain how this discrepancy caused 
the explosion. (R. at 7008:54-55) Finally, Dr. Alex states there is no evidence that 
another hole was drilled. (R. at 7008:55) Dr. Alex's testimony and testing has been set 
forth at length in the statement of facts and in point I of this brief The threading and 
insertion evidence and Dr. Alex's testimony is the only evidence of causation presented at 
trial. Importantly, Dr. Alex conceded no evidence exists to prove Oakwood put excessive 
force on its pipe to make it fit. (R. at 6698:83) According to Dr. Alex, no evidence 
existed on any of the fracture surfaces. (R. at 7008:72) And the fractures were consistent 
with having been caused by the explosion rather than prior to the explosion. (R. at 
7008:101) Finally, there was no evidence that a subsequent force caused the pipe to move 
and cause a full thickness crack. (R. at 7008:117) Accordingly, other than the above 
mentioned evidence and Dr. Alex's testimony which is set forth at length (see, e.g., pp. 
51-54, supra), there is no other evidence to marshal. 
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Co., 876 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1994). In this case, plaintiffs evidence failed to establish 
any of these elements. 
His!, plaintiff strained to identify a defect or defective condition. After 
examining the pipe recovered f rom tiu , -,; •- •-,-;: \u,.> •• r^s experts 1 1 latchei and Alex 
concluded the pipe had too many threads in some places, the pipe had not been inserted 
far enough into some joints, and the pipe had been inserted too far into other joints. This 
threading i^; insertion, according to plaintiffs experts, violated certain ANSI and ASME 
standards. Although the ANSI and ASME standards are referenced by the governing 
HUD standards, the HUD regulations set the standard which the home must mcv* 
7009:142-44) The only expert on standards governing the manufactured home industry 
testified the gas piping as manufactured by Oakwood would pass the applicable 
regulations. (R. at 7010:*"- * *• 4) 1 hus, 111 onl\ expert, and the expert relied oi. r> !); 
Alex regarding the applicable standards, testified the Oakwood home o- : 
defect due to overthreaded and over and underinserted pipes.15 
N the objective evidence is inconsistent with a defect existing at all or at 
the time the house was sold. It is i it [disputed tl :te gas pipes in the Ercanbrack home did 
15
 Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(3) provides that there is a rebuttable presumption 
that a product is free from any defective condition if the methods of manufacturing and 
techniques for testing are in conformity with government standards for the industry. 
Indeed, as part of his "send a message" argument, plaintiffs counsel conceded the HUD 
standard was not interpreted or enforced to require a certain amount of threads or 
insertion into joints. (R. at 7012:19-7-1) 
not leak when it left Oakwood's manufacturing facility, when it was hooked to the 
outside propane tank or after the explosion. Additionally, it is undisputed the 
Ercanbracks lived in the home for several months without experiencing or noticing any 
leaks in the propane system. In order to prevail, plaintiff had to show a manufacturing 
defect which existed when the home was sold. Under the applicable HUD regulations, 
the objective physical evidence showed no defect existed before or after the explosion. 
Finally, the undisputed testimony showed any problems due to threading and assembly of 
the pipes would not have caused Oakwood to put force on the pipes in a manner to create 
a crack. (R. at 7004:73-74, 120-21,156-58,166-67) 
Finally, plaintiff relied on Dr. Alex to establish the causal connection 
between Oakwood's manufacturing of the gas pipes and the explosion that occurred. Dr. 
Alex tried to make the required connection by identifying a potential defect in the gas 
pipes and then making some post-hoc explanations to show how the defect could have led 
to the explosion. In substance, the sufficiency of the causal connection essentially 
succeeds or fails based on the admissibility and foundation for Dr. Alex's testimony. 
This court has recognized, however, an expert's opinion "is nevertheless limited by the 
foundation laid for it. A declaration about causation is inadmissible 'where an expert 
witness has not testified to sufficient facts on which to base his opinion.'" Patey v. 
Lainhart 1999 UT 31,1J23, 977 P.2d 1193. 
As the Utah Court of Appeals has discussed, "it is not enough to merely 
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contend that a defect existed, show that an accident occurred, and assume the two are 
necessarily related." Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) .ipl.r.ktine grant of summary judgment where plaintiff had no evidence of defect 
on bicycle). Nevertheless, Dr. Alc^ ] o ; ! lex uses - ,'osion 
occurred to assume a manufacturing defect caused the explosion. Because some of the 
gas pipes recovered after the explosion were fractured. Dr. Alex assumes one of the 
fractures was the source of the lea. \ -n '^ . ' - >3; 6698:66-78; 7008:16, 21) Dr. Alex 
did not have the requisite foundati* • • i •< testimony. The font idational pi: oblems were 
set forth at length in section I-B. 
In this case, plaintiff presented a story to the jury regarding pipe threading 
and insertion in an attempt to show a manufacturing defect. The evidence does not 
support plaintiffs version of the event. "'When tln: proximate cause of an injury is left to 
speculation, the claim fails as a matter of law."' Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 
240, 246 (Utah 1985). In order for the jury to find a defect and causation, the jury had to 
ignore or disbelief uncontradicted witness testimony,16 speculate as to manufacturing 
16
 Like Dr. Alex, the jury is not entitled to completely disregard or disbelief the 
uncontradicted testimony from Oakwood's employees. See Quintana-Ruiz v. Hyundai 
Motor Corp., 303 F.3d 62, (1st Cir. 2002) (discussing jury is not at liberty to disregard 
uncontradicted testimony unless it is inherently improbable, contradictory or riddled with 
omissions); Perfetti v. First National Bank of Chicago, 950F.2d 449, 454 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(finding jury could not reasonably disbelieve all of defendant's employees' testimony); 
Martin v. Citibank, N.A., 762 F.2d 212, 217-18 (2nd Cir. 1985) (holding plaintiff failed 
to offer sufficient evidence to prove claim where only evidence contradicted 
discrimination); Kenneth E. Curran, Inc. v. Salvucci, 426 F.2d 920, (1st Cir. 1970) 
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processes which put undue force on the pipe and speculate about a later unidentified force 
which caused an alleged non full thickness crack to grow into a full crack. When the jury 
is required to speculate about an essential element f plaintiff s case as was required in 
this matte: the claim fails as a matter of law. The trial court erred in not granting 
Oakwood's Motion for a Directed Verdict or its Motion for J.N.O.V. 
IV. After Oakwood Relied on Plaintiffs Admissions During Its Opening 
Statement, the Trial Court Erred by Allowing Plaintiff to Offer Evidence 
Contrary to the Admission. 
Allowing evidence contrary to the admission after Oakwood relied on the 
admission as conclusively established was highly prejudicial to Oakwood and incited the 
jury's passion against Oakwood. Rule 36(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides: "Any matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court 
on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission." Utah R. Civ. P. 36(b). 
The first part of Rule 36 provides that it is self-executing. See Utah R. Civ. P. 36(a)(2); 
In re Pendleton, 2000 UT 77,1(42, 11 P.3d 284. Due to the self-executing provision, 
Oakwood was entitled to rely on plaintiffs admission at trial.17 
Only after Oakwood represented to the jury certain facts were conclusively 
(noting even though testimony was "evasive" and "incredible at times" it still required 
jury to speculate); Federal Ins. Co. v. Summers, 403 F.2d 971, 974 (1st Cir. 1968) (noting 
trier of fact may not use disbelief of witness testimony alone to find the opposite is true). 
17
 In fact, plaintiff knew Oakwood could rely on the admissions, as Oakwood had 
relied on other admissions contained in the same set of Request for Admissions in its 
request for partial summary judgment against SS Supply. (R. at 5887-88; 6994:24-26) 
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established, did Oakwood learn plaintiff was intending to present previously undisclosed 
evidence and testimony to contradict the admission. (R. at 6697:24-29) At this point, 
Oakwood, not plaintiff, brought the issue of contradictory evidence to the court's 
attention. (R. at 6697:24) Rule 36 requires the party seeking to amend or withdraw an 
admission to present a motion to the court. Utah R. Civ. P. 36(b); see also Carney v. 
Internal Revenue Service, 258 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating proper procedure for 
amending or withdrawing an admission is to file a motion with the court); Metzler v. 
Lykes Pasco, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 1438, 1443 (S.D. Fla. 1997) ("An admission that is not 
withdrawn or amended cannot be rebutted by contrary testimony or ignored by a district 
court."). As part of a motion to withdraw or amend an admission, the moving party, 
plaintiff in this case, must show: "(1) amendment or withdrawal would serve the 
presentation of the merits of the action, and (2) amendment or withdrawal would not 
prejudice [the nonmoving party] in maintaining [its] action on the merits." Langeland v. 
Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah 1998). 
In this case, plaintiff never submitted a motion to withdraw the admissions. 
(R. at 6697:24) Notwithstanding the failure of plaintiff to move to amend or withdraw 
the admissions, the trial court addressed the issue on Oakwood's request to prevent 
plaintiff from offering the contrary evidence. After reviewing the admissions and 
listening to counsel, the trial court determined the admission was ambiguous (absent any 
such objection from plaintiff in his response to the original request for admission) and 
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plaintiff *>as entitled to offer evidence to clarify his responses to the admissions. (R. at 
6697:24-29) This ruling was an abuse of the trial court's conditional discretion and highly 
prejudicial to Oakwood. 
This court has ruled: "The trial court does not have discretion to unilaterally 
disregard the admissions." Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Ctr., Inc., 702 P.2d 98, 100 (Utah 
1985); Langeland, 952 P.2d at 1060. Nevertheless, the trial court in this case made an 
independent determination that the admissions were ambiguous. 
In Langeland, the trial court similarly allowed amendments to be withdrawn 
without any findings or supporting analysis. See id. at 1061. In reviewing that grant, this 
court reviewed <e court's decision de novo. See id. In this case, the trial court was 
influenced by the what it perceived to be ambiguities in the admission and evidence 
which tended to suggest the admission was incorrect. Accordingly, the court believed the 
merits would be served by allowing plaintiff to introduce evidence contrary to the 
admission. 
Had plaintiff moved for amendment of the admission prior to trial, the trial 
court's ailing may have been proper in light of the evidence which plaintiff brought 
forward. In this case, however, two factors indicate the trial court should have denied 
plaintiffs request to offer contrary evidence. First, Oakwood had already relied on the 
admission and made representations to the jury regarding the admission. Second, the 
evidence used to contradict the admissions had not previously been disclosed to Oakwood 
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to show it would not be justified in relying on the admission. As courts examining the 
similar federal mle have observed: "Once trial begins, a more restrictive standard is to be 
applied in permitting a party to withdraw or amend an admission." 999 v. C.I.T. Corp., 
776 F.2d 866, (9th Cir. 1985) (noting subject of admission had already been presented to 
the jury); American Automobile Assoc, v. AAA Legal Clinic of Jefferson Crooke, 930 
F.2d 1117, 1120 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding once trial has begun, a court will not permit 
withdrawal or amendment "unless failure to do so would cause 'manifest injustice."'). 
If plaintiff believed this admission was ambiguous or incorrect, plaintiff 
should have objected to the admission or simply denied it. Instead, plaintiff affirmatively 
admitted to the facts as set forth in the admission. After plaintiff listened to Oakwood's 
opening statement which relied on the admission, plaintiff indicated he had evidence 
contrary to the admission which he intended to offer. Although this evidence tends to 
indicate the admission was incorrect, plaintiff must also show no prejudice would result 
to Oakwood in introducing the evidence. Because Oakwood had already presented the 
admission to the jury as a conclusive fact, allowing plaintiff to offer contrary evidence 
with no instruction or clarification to the jury was devastating and prejudicial to 
Oakwood. 
As has been discussed in prior points, the explosion's cause and origin was 
difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain from the recovered remnants of the explosion. In 
order to attempt to meet his burden, plaintiff relied on circumstantial evidence, expert 
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testimony and credibility determinations. The credibility of the parties, their counsel and 
the witnesses was a crucial factor in this case. By introducing this contrary evidence, 
plaintiff, in essence, was able to suggest Oakwood was lying and misrepresenting facts. 
Prior to plaintiff disclosing this evidence after the trial had begun, Oakwood had no 
reason to anticipate the sheriffs log was incorrect regarding the time of plaintiff s call. 
The log was kept by a disinterested third party as part of its regular business. 
Once the court allowed this evidence to come in, Oakwood had to abandon 
this line of evidence and hope the jury forgot about the opening as well. Plaintiff 
reminded the jury about Oakwood's statements about when the call was made, stating in 
Closing: "We'll [Oakwood] even tell you what Bill did do and imply that something was 
wrong with that. They never proved that, did they? What they did was, they changed in 
mid stream. They made their opening statement and then all of a sudden they changed 
because they had to, because the police officers are like, no, that's all wrong." (R. at 
7012:9-10) 
Although allowing the contrary evidence to come in after Oakwood's 
reliance would always be prejudicial, the circumstances of this case exacerbated the 
prejudice. Plaintiff was not only allowed to contradict his sworn admission but also to 
suggest Oakwood's credibility was suspect. Plaintiffs closing argument stated to the jury 
in no uncertain terms that Oakwood had made a promise it could conclusively show a 
time discrepancy which later turned out to be false. In order to prove his case, plaintiff 
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had to have the jury believe Oakwood lied about its manufacturing process. The 
uncontradicted testimony of Oakwc d's employees showed the force necessary to sustain 
Dr. Alex's theory would not occur given the system for building the homes. Now, 
plaintiff was able to point to a specific representation from Oakwood's opening statement 
which it was unable to prove. Plaintiff seized on this opportunity to paint Oakwood as 
dishonest and desperate. Accordingly, the trial court's decision to allow the contrary 
evidence was highly prejudicial to Oakwood and a reversible error warranting a new trial 
of this matter. 
V. The Trial Court Erred In Refusing To Grant a New Trial Because of 
Prejudicial Remarks Made By Plaintiffs Counsel In Closing Argument. 
Judge Higginbotham, in Draper v. AIRCO, Inc., 580 F.2d 91 (3rd Cir. 
1978), reversed a jury verdict for plaintiff in a wrongful death suit and remanded the case 
for a new trial due to plaintiffs counsel's misconduct in closing arguments. Judge 
Higginbotham framed the issue with which this Court must wrestle: 
In reaching this conclusion, we wish to emphasize that we do 
not expect advocacy to be devoid of passion. A life has been 
lost here and the family is entitled to have someone speak 
with eloquence and compassion for their cause. But jurors 
must ultimately base their judgment on the evidence presented 
and the rational inferences therefrom. Thus, there must be 
limits to pleas of pure passion and there must be restraints 
against blatant appeals to bias and prejudice. These bounds of 
conduct are defined by the Code of Professional 
Responsibility and the case law. 
Id. at 95. 
55 
The Utah Rules of Professional Conduct provide at Rule 3.4(e) that a 
lawyer shall not: 
(e) In trial, elude to any matter that the lawyer does not 
reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be 
supported by admissible evidence, assert personal 
knowledge of facts and issue except when testifying as 
a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness 
of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability 
of a civil litigant or the guilt of innocence of an 
accused; . . . . 
As noted above, it is this proscription, along with case law, that will guide 
this Court's assessment of the prejudicial impact of plaintiff s counsel's misconduct 
during closing arguments. Appellant asserts that plaintiffs arguments were prejudicial in 
the following respects: (1) use of "send a message" argument when no punitive damages 
were claimed; (2) reference to merits of plaintiff s case; (3) reference to defendant as 
"out-of-state" corporation interested in making a profit; and (4) statements regarding 
witness credibility. 
In Fisher v. Mcllroy, 739 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987), the defendant 
appealed from the trial court's ruling vacating a jury verdict in favor of the defendant on 
his counterclaim against the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals affirmed the granting of a 
motion for a new trial on the grounds that defense counsel's conduct in closing arguments 
had prejudiced the jury whose award had been based on bias, passion and prejudice. 
The court noted that defense counsel in its closing argument had invited the 
jury to respond in damages to show to the plaintiff and others "like him" that the 
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plaintiffs behavior in operating his vehicle as alleged by the defendant was almost 
wanton. Id. at 582. The defendant contended that his remarks did not constitute a request 
for punitive damages, but only a proper request for compensation. The appellate court 
reasoned: 
The closing argument to a jury that the jury could, by its 
verdict, speak out about its feelings as to a certain matter in 
issue at trial and that the jury could send a message to a 
particular group in the community through its verdict is 
viewed as injecting the issue of punitive damages into a case 
through the argument, even though such damages had not 
been pled. Smith v. Courter, 531 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Mo. 
1976). This argument entitled the opposing party to a new 
trial. Id 
Id. The Court of Appeals held that the argument by defendant's attorney for the jury to 
"send a message to the young people in this city" did indeed inject a plea for punitive 
damages into the trial, the argument had been objected to by plaintiffs counsel, and for 
that reason, the trial court's order granting a new trial was affirmed. 
In Maercks v. Birchanskv, 549 So. 2d 199 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989), the 
defendant appealed from a jury verdict awarding the plaintiff $750,000.00 in 
compensatory damages in a medical malpractice action. Defendant had made a motion 
for a new trial, arguing that plaintiffs counsel had engaged in improper argument during 
closing and had denied him a fair trial. The trial court denied the motion. 
The medical malpractice suit had been for compensatory damages only. On 
appeal, the Florida Court of Appeals noted that it had stated repeatedly that "we will not 
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condone such arguments as were made in closing where counsel for plaintiff three times 
asked the jury as the 'conscience of the community' to 'send a message with its verdict,' . 
. . ." Based on this misconduct, as well as plaintiffs counsel making derogatory personal 
remarks about opposing counsel, asserting his personal opinion as to the credibility of a 
witness, and the justness of his cause, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
See also Murphy v. Murphy, 622 S.2d 99 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (new trial; counsel 
"overstepped the boundaries of advocacy in expressing his personal views," including his 
opinion that the jury should "send a message"); Masson v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 
642 P.2d 113, 117 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982) (new trial; summation advised that a jury which 
returned a favorable verdict "will have done that one American duty and sent a message 
to a utility that you are not going to put up with this kind of treatment of your citizens"). 
At this trial, plaintiffs counsel made the following inflammatory and 
irreversibly prejudicial remarks: 
If the parents of the children, HUD and Oakwood, if the 
parents don't care why would the children care. Well, this is 
the time to teach the children a lesson. It is the only way to be 
able to send a message. This explosion is in HUD's data 
base, but not because the pipe was substandard. So what 
difference does it make? They're just going to put in there, 
well, people died in a manufactured home, that's not going to 
do anything. It is of no consequence. The thread standard 
ain't going to be enforced any better today than before the 
Ercanbrack family died. What does it take? It takes you to 
send a message. 
* * * 
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Unfortunately, some corporations will do as little as they can 
get away with under the regulations and guidelines. And 
although these standards are law, HUD chooses not to 
enforce. Well, looks like we're going to have to send a 
message to Oakwood because no one else is. We are going to 
have to send a message that their practices are unacceptable. 
Mr. Plant: Your Honor -
The Court: Mr. D'Elia. Mr. D'Elia, approach, please. 
(R. at 7012:19-22) 
At this point, the court gives a short, curative instruction that punitive 
damages are not an issue and that any damages awarded must be to compensate, not to 
punish. After such an extreme presentation of a punitive damages argument, however, 
the salutory effect of the trial court's curative instruction is best summed up by the trial 
judge in the case of O'Rear v. Freuhauf Corp., 554 F.2d 1304, 1309 (5th Cir. 1977): 
"You can throw a skunk into the jury box and instruct the jurors not to smell it, but it 
doesn't do any good." 
Ercanbrack's counsel compounded the prejudicial nature of the closing 
argument when he improperly argued that if Oakwood's defenses as to liability were 
valid, the court would have dismissed Ercanbrack's claims prior to trial. The prejudicial 
effect of this argument cannot be underestimated and the comment in and of itself 
warrants a new trial. 
In Donahue v. Intermountain Health Care, 748 P.2d 1067 (Utah 1987), the 
Utah Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's grant of a new trial because plaintiffs 
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counsel had insinuated in closing arguments that the case should have been resolved prior 
to trial, and plaintiff attempted to resolve the matter, but the defendant pushed the matter 
to trial. The Court observed that plaintiffs counsers arguments appeared to be motivated 
by desire to stir up the jury emotionally against the defendant, and the arguments could 
have prejudiced the jurors against the defendant and caused them to render an inflated 
verdict. Id. at 1068. Consequently, this Court affirmed the trial court's grant of a new 
trial. Id. 
A similar result is warranted in this c -e. Ercanbrack's counsel's improper 
arguments stirred the jury's emotions and unfairly prejudiced them against Oakwood. 
Although Oakwood's counsel objected to the argument and the court sustained the 
objection (R. at 7012:70), no curative instruction was given and the arguments 
irreparably tainted the proceedings and obviously had a strong influence on the jury's 
deliberation and their verdict. The fact that the jury awarded damages for Ercanbrack's 
personal lost earnings and benefits, contrary to the court's instructions, demonstrates that 
the jury acted under the influence of passion and prejudice. Ercanbrack's counsel's 
objectionable and prejudicial comments created an irregularity in the proceedings 
sufficiently severe to warrant a new trial 
At the start of plaintiff s closing argument, counsel quickly pointed out that 
defendant Oakwood was an out-of-state North Carolina corporation. (R. at 7012:4) Not 
satisfied with noting Oakwood's citizenship, plaintiffs counsel goes on to inflame the 
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passion of the jury as follows: 
How were the defendants negligent? Well, Oakwood is a 
large corporation with its principal office in North Carolina 
and plants in California, Texas, Colorado and other places. 
They build and they sell, they mass produce homes. They rely 
upon manufacturing a large number of homes and then 
producing them for making a profit just like any other 
corporation. (R. at 7012:15) 
Taken in isolation, such arguments , which do not go to the merits of the 
case but are intended only to bias the jury, may not be sufficient to require reversal and 
remand for a new trial. This argument would not require reversal if it had not preceded 
plaintiffs "send a message" damages argument. First, plaintiff raises the ire of the jury 
by pointing out that the defendant is an out-of-state large corporation that is only 
interested in profit, and then instructs them that they must "send a message" to this large, 
out-of-state corporation that only seeks profit. The cumulative thrust of plaintiff s 
counsel's argument is that because the defendant is a large, rich corporation, and because 
they know that the plaintiff is a poor resident of their own county, the jury should base its 
verdict in favor of plaintiff on this financial disparity. "But justice is not dependent upon 
the wealth or poverty of the parties and a jury should not be urged to predicate its verdict 
on a prejudice against bigness or wealth." Draper v. AIRCCX Inc., 580 F.2d 91, 95 (3rd 
Cir. 1978). 
It is in direct violation of Rule 3.4(e) for a lawyer at trial to allude to any 
matter that is not relevant or to express a personal opinion as to the credibility of a 
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witness or a litigant. Plaintiffs counsel expressly violated that prohibition several times 
during his closing argument. A prime example can be found in counsel's discussion of 
the testimony of John Bailey, an employee of former defendant SS Supply (R. at 
7012:75-76) Plaintiffs counsel discusses Mr. Bailey, and his relationship with defense 
counsel in the following terms: 
I think the better thing to do now - he says Bailey. You really 
believe Bailey? See the way he addresses Mr. Plant? Gee, 
under the circumstances, he is going to ask everything from 
him. Smiling at him. Boy, he knew exactly what he was 
talking about. Spit those questions and answers. As soon as I 
stood up, Good afternoon, Mr. Bailey. Good afternoon. 
When did you meet last? Silence. Sorry, I don't understand 
you, he said, oh, when did you meet with Mr. Plant? I don't 
remember. Three weeks ago was all it was said Mr Rigby. 
But he doesn't remember. It's because he doesn't want to tell 
you the truth. They're in cahoots. They are absolutely in 
cahoots. They met with them on times. I never met with 
Bailey, he doesn't talk to me, he talks with them. He's their 
witness. They're in cahoots but he is trying to make you 
believe that under the circumstances, gee, Bailey is most the 
objective guy in the world. He is just for the propane 
company. No, he's not. He's in cahoots with the Oakwood 
people right now because under the circumstances, whatever 
the reason, he locked himself into a story at one time. It just 
happens to fall it. Politics make strange bed fellows. He is 
with him. That's not the point. 
And again, did you see what they stood up? Somebody's 
lying. Boom, they point right to him. Bill's not lying. (R. at 
7012:75-76) 
In one fell swoop, plaintiffs counsel accuses defense counsel of the 
subornation of perjury, accuses a witness of lying, and personally vouches for the fact that 
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his client is not lying. Admittedly, defense counsel did not object to this prejudicial 
comment. It was, however, error on the part of plaintiff s counsel to make such 
outrageous statements, the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for Oakwood had plaintiffs counsel 
not made such outrageous accusations. See State v. Medina Juarez, 2001 UT 79, If 18, 34 
P.3d 187 (discussing standards to demonstrate plain error). Indeed, in light of the 
inflammatory quality and sheer quantity of plaintiff s counsel's misconduct during 
closing arguments, review is warranted to prevent plain error . See Bradley v. Romeo, 
716 P.2d 227, 228 (Nev. 1986) (recognizing that "[t]he ability of this court to consider 
relevant issues sua sponte in order to prevent plain error is well established"); see also 
Kaas v. Atlas Chemical Co.. 623 So. 2d 525, 526 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (attorney's 
expression of his personal opinion that an expert witness is a liar is misconduct 
warranting a new trial, and no objection is required because such arguments fall squarely 
within that category of fundamental error in which the basic right to a fair trial has been 
fatally compromised). 
Plaintiffs counsel's attack on the credibility of Mr. Bailey and his laudatory 
comments about the credibility of his own client are both grounds for reversal of this 
verdict and remanding for a new trial. See, e.g., Blanch Road Corp. v. Bensalem 
Township, 57 F.3d 253, 264 (3rd Cir. 1995) (counsel's comment that a particular 
witness's testimony had been honest and accurate deemed inappropriate, new trial 
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granted); Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc. v. Martin, 590 F. Supp. 328, 333 (E.D. 
Pa. 1984) (laudatory comments violate the rule against commenting on the credibility of a 
witness - only new trial could cure client's inappropriate arguments). Finally, plaintiffs 
inappropriate, prejudicial and inflammatory remarks during closing argument were 
compounded by counsel's specifying a target amount for the jury to award. (R. at 
7012:31-34, where plaintiffs counsel first sets a damages starting point of $6,883,288.00 
and R. at 7012:80, where plaintiffs counsel asserts that the jury should award up to 
$10,000,000.00). 
If this Court is going to "send a message" to trial counsel in the State of 
Utah, it should do so with respect to this issue and admonish counsel not to specify a 
target amount for the jury to award. "Such suggestions anchor the juror's expectations of 
a fair award at a place set by counsel, rather than by the evidence." Consorti v. 
Armstrong World IncL Inc.. 72 F.3d 1003, 1016 (2nd Cir. 1995). Again, in and of itself, 
counsel's telling the jury what to award may not be such plain error as to mandate 
reversal. Under the facts of this case, however, and given the cumulative nature of 
plaintiffs counsel misconduct during closing argument, this further instance of 
inappropriate statements to the jury requires reversal and remand for a new trial. 
VI. SS Supply Was A Proximate Cause of the Injuries and the Amount of Its 
Settlement Should Have Been Disclosed to the Jury to Ensure a Proper 
Award. 
"Utah courts have consistently recognized that '"a more recent [or 
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criminal/intentional] act may . . . relieve the liability of a prior negligent actor under the 
proper circumstances.'"" Bansasine v. Bodell 927 P.2d 675, 677 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
(citation omitted). Assuming, arguendo, Oakwood manufactured a defective mobile 
home, the undisputed facts show SS Supply was an intervening and unforeseeable cause 
of the explosion and injuries. Whether or not a subsequent act can relieve a prior 
negligent party of liability depends on the foreseeability of the subsequent negligent act. 
See id.; Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240, 245-46 & n.20 (Utah 1985). In 
this case, SS Supply provided a tank to the Ercanbracks that contained rust. It is 
undisputed that rust causes ethyl mercaptan to oxidize and lose its odor. (R. at 2976-77) 
It is well established that the odor is added to propane as a last warning of a propane leak. 
(R. at 2976-77) 
Plaintiffs pleading sets forth that had the propane still possessed its odor, 
the plaintiff and his family would have smelled the leaking propane and avoided the 
tragic explosion. (R. at 2976-77; 5159; 5167-68; 5887-88; 6994:25) Oakwood could not 
reasonably foresee that SS Supply would provide the Ercanbracks with a rusty tank, 
thereby depleting the propane of its odor and preventing the Ercanbracks from detecting a 
leak. Given plaintiffs admissions and his pleadings, the trial court erred in not 
instructing the jury that SS Supply was a, if not the, proximate cause of the injuries.18 
18
 Due to the allotment of time to the parties to present their respective cases, 
Oakwood had little ability to both defend against plaintiffs allegations and put on an 
affirmative case demonstrating SS Supply's liability. 
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Prior to trial, SS Supply settled with plaintiff for the sum of S3.25 million. 
In light of SS Supply's liability for supplying an unreasonably dangerous and defective 
propane tank, Oakwood requested the jury be informed not only of the settlement but also 
of the amount. Admittedly, this court has stated: "instances would be rare when the 
amount of the settlement should be disclosed." Slusher v. OspitaK 777 P.2d 437, 444 
(Utah 1989). One of the concerns with disclosure of settlement is the jury will infer 
liability to a settling party, thereby relieving other defendants from a finding of fault. See 
id. at 442. Given the facts establishing SS Supply's liability, this problem is substantially 
mitigated in this case. In this circumst ce, the jury cannot make an appropriate award 
unless it has a knowledge of the amount already paid. 
VII. The Errors in this Case Were Substantial and Pervasive Enough to 
Undermine Any Confidence that a Fair Trial Was Had. 
In addition to the six reversible errors set forth above, the trial in this matter 
was not conducted in a manner to afford Oakwood a fair opportunity. As such, the 
cumulative errors denied Oakwood its due process and a new trial is required. See United 
States Const. XIV Amend., § 1; Utah Const. Art. I, § 7. This court has stated: ''While no 
one error by itself perhaps mandates reversal, the cumulative effect of the several errors 
undermines our confidence that defendants were able to present to the jury their theory of 
the case and that a fair trial was had." Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 
P.2d 920, 928 (Utah 1990). In Whitehead, the trial court erroneously excluded some of 
defendant's evidence and then improperly restricted defendant's ability to cross examine 
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plaintiffs witness on the same issue. See id. This court found those two errors sufficient 
to warrant a new trial. 
In this case, the errors were more pervasive. Similar to Whitehead, 
however, the errors were interrelated and built on one another. The trial court committed 
two additional errors which on their own may have been harmless, but when combined 
with the others were devastating. For example, the trial court set no deadlines for 
discovery or expert testing, as a consequence the parties were conducting rebuttal tests up 
until trial. In the end, however, only Oakwood's expert's last test was excluded. (R. at 
6697:19-22) As discussed earlier, plaintiffs story of what caused the accident was not 
supported by facts in evidence or scientific methodology. Oakwood's expert constructed 
a full-scale replica of the gas piping system used in the Ercanbrack's home. This model 
was not used to for any novel scientific theory, but rather to show the jury how the pipes 
look and function. Despite the fact this model was nothing new or novel, the trial court 
excluded it citing its "10-day rule." (R. at 6697:22) 
Furthermore, the trial took place over twelve days. Due to the burden of 
proof and defendant's cross examination, it often occurs that plaintiffs case-in-chief 
takes longer than defendant's. In this case, however, the disparity in the allotted time was 
so severe that it limited Oakwood's ability to put on its case. Oakwood was forced to 
exclude several witnesses it had intended to call. (R. at 7007:17-20) As discussed, 
Oakwood was not only defending against plaintiffs claims, but it also needed to put on 
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evidence showing SS Supply's culpability. Had the trial court, prior to trial, agreed to 
instruct the jury that SS Supply was a proximate cause, this burden could have been 
mitigated. 
In discussing principles of fairness, this court long ago noted the concept of 
due process meant "that a party shall have his day in court-that is each party shall have 
the right to a hearing before a competent court, with the privilege of being heard and 
introducing evidence to establish his cause or defense, after which domes judgment upon 
the record thus made." Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 316 (Utah 1945) This court 
went on to enumerate several factors essential to an action before a person may deprived 
of life or liberty. See id. at 317. A part of the process involves not only the right to be 
heard, but the right to put evidence and exclude improper prejudicial evidence. Federal 
courts have recognized: "Cumulative errors, while individually harmless, when taken 
together can prejudice a defendant as much as a single reversible error and violate a 
defendant's right to due process of law." United States v. Allen, 269 F.3d 842, 847 (7th 
Cir. 2001). In this case, the accumulated errors occurred throughout the proceedings in 
this matter deprived Oakwood of its due process of law and resulted in an unsupportable 
jury verdict against it. 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing errors undermine the confidence that a fair trial took place. 
As a result of these errors, the jury rendered an inflated verdict based on passion and 
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prejudice rather than the evidence presented. Oakvvood respectfully requests this court 
either reverse and rule plaintiffs case fails as a matter of law or remand for a new trial 
with instructions. 
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